

## **National Assembly and Anti-Corruption Crusade in Nigeria: Myth or Reality, 2011-2019**

**Kabari, John Baribor, Ph.D**

Department of Public Administration, Ebonyi State University, Abakiliki, Nigeria

### **ABSTRACT**

The Legislature is an important institution of government in a democratic political system. The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria bestows on the Legislature enormous power in regard to the anti-corruption crusade. But the widespread corruption in Nigeria has made some scholars to ponder on the effectiveness of the Nigerian National Assembly in anti-corruption crusade? Therefore this study sought to examine the role of the National Assembly in the anti-corruption crusade. The objectives of this study are: to examine if Nigerian legislature is essential in the anti-corruption crusade; to examine if Nigerian legislature has contributed significantly to the anti-corruption crusade and to examine if the absence of political will among Nigerian legislators is a problem inhibiting the anti-corruption crusade in Nigeria. The study adopted content analysis. Documentary ideas as expressed in textbooks, journal articles, magazines, the Internet and Newspapers were analyzed and utilized. Although the National Assembly made some effort in relation to the anti-corruption crusade by introducing anti-corruption bills such as; The Whistle Blower Bill, Witness Protection Bill, Anti-money Laundering Bill, Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matter and the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) Bill, paradoxically, the study discovered that the members of the National Assembly were only concerned with their interest and not the interest of the public that voted them into the various position in the National Assembly. The study identified corruption as the reason why the National Assembly was unable to offer robust legislation. It was therefore recommended that the National Assembly must fight against corruption by first setting a good example to others.

**Keywords:** National Assembly, Bill, Corruption, Anti-corruption Crusade, Whistleblower

### **I. Introduction**

Corruption is a worldwide wonder, justifiably just in its societal settings. Its existence gives rise to sporadic advantage as opposed to legitimate and morale standards and dissolves the ability to secure the welfare of a nation (Ibrahim & Madya, 2017). The annals of corruption are as old as the world itself because antiquated civic establishments have hints of common “wrongness” and debasement” (Ibrahim & Madya, 2017). Corruption has affected all nations across the globe especially the developing states in Africa, and Nigeria in particular (Eugene, 2013, in Ibrahim 2017). According to Ogundiya (2009), the manifestation of the crisis is clear, and the consequence is grievous. Collaborating the above assertion, former chairman of anti-craft agency (Economic Financial and Crime Commission) Mallam Nuhu Ribadu hinted

that the top Nigerian officials have squandered or wasted almost \$380 billion between 1960 and 1999 (Ibrahim & Madya, 2014).

Furthermore, Nigeria lost \$4 billion to \$8 billion due to corruption each year from 1999-2017. However, the figure has been increasing from 2007-2017 (Ibrahim & Madya 2017). Corruption has become a major challenge to Nigeria in its quest for enduring socio-economic, political and technological development as well as efficient and productive utilization of allocated resources in the millennium (Mojeed & Joseph 2010). The devastating effects of corruption in the nation have manifested in the lopsided distribution of wealth, malfunctioned or decayed infrastructure and degrading living conditions among a great proportion of the citizenry. These have impacted negatively on all aspects of the developmental agenda. The country cannot but therefore respond to both domestic and international pressures to confront corruption with all possible strategies available. Ironically, the institutional mechanism offered by the constitution for the fight against corrupt practices is itself not immune from the plague. Indeed, the creation of extra-legislative institutions saddled with the tasks of fighting corruption is itself an indictment of the constitutional framework and a pointer to the wide gulf of difference between the constitutional prescriptions and the practical realities in our emerging democracy preceded by long years of impunity (Mojeed & Joseph 2010).

For reason not unconnected with the damaging impact of corruption on any nation where it is deeply noted and the limitation imposed on international bodies by the observance of the rule of national sovereignty, the crusade against corruption has often been domesticated. To this end, international institutions like the World Bank (WB), and the international parliamentary Association (IPA) have continued to champion the need to combat corruption, such efforts could only catalyze domestic institutions to confront corruption (Mojeed & Joseph 2010). It serves no guarantee that national institution saddled with the task would perform their duties at all or as required.

Although a broad-based coalition of actors, especially comprising the executive, legislature and the judiciary is needed if any progress will be made in curbing corruption (Leautier, 2006), the role of the legislature particularly appears all-encompassing and very important (Wolffowitz, 2006). The legislature as the accredited representatives of the people must protect public funds and other resources (Mojeed and Joseph 2010). As the controller of the

purse, it has the additional duty of serving as the guardian of the public treasury. Moreover, appropriation of funds for public expenditures requires the legislature to monitor the use of such funds to ensure judicious utilization for the overall benefits of the people. According to Mojeed & Joseph (2010), legislature occupies an advantageous position in the making and unmaking of all laws, including those pertaining to the eradication/reduction of corrupt practices in public and private life. This, indeed, appears to be concomitant with the views not only among the WB and IPA, but also among other commentators on corruption that national representative assemblies stand in good stead to curb corruption (Stapenhurst, *et al.* 2006, in Mojeed & Joseph, 2010).

The constitutional architecture of Nigeria designates the National Assembly as the “watchdog of public funds”, in sections 99 and 89 of the 1999 constitution (as amended). While section 88(2) b empowers the National Assembly to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste in the execution or administration of laws within its legislative competence...”.Section 89 grants the National assembly enormous powers to summon, examine and investigate any person in Nigeria and cause evidence to be procured in the course of performing its legislative functions. The combined effects of section 88 and 89, no doubt, is intended to make the National Assembly the bastion of the anti-corruption crusade, the driver of a corrupt-free state, and the guardian of public funds (Vincent and Kenneth, 2018). The ‘watchdog’ function of the National Assembly (NA), according to Ogbondah (2004) in Vincent and Kenneth (2018), involves investigating and unearthing the quantum levels of corruption, bribery, embezzlement, ineptitude, lack of accountability, graft and other nefarious practices inherent within the factions and fractions of the ruling civilian bourgeoisie. Furthermore, section 4 of the constitution also emphasizes that the National Assembly shall have the power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the federation or any part thereof (Vincent & Kenneth, 2017).

Good governance, according to McCaulley (2011) remains the cornerstone for any nation’s political and economic development. This critical role of the National Assembly probably explains why John Locke describes the legislature as “the supreme powers of the commonwealth’, (Vincent & Kenneth, 2018). A major component of legislating for “good government” as prescribed in section 4 is combating all forms of corruption in public sector management (Idebisi, 2013).

Be that as it may, despite the enormous power bestowed on the National Assembly by the constitution, in curbing corrupt practices in Nigeria, the Nigerian legislature has not pragmatic effort in the crusade against corruption. In some cases, the senators were arrested and sued for corrupt practices especially among the 5<sup>th</sup> National Assembly lawmakers. This has made scholars ponder on the effectiveness of the National Assembly (that is made up of people with corruption cases in the courts) to effectively and efficiently carry out a crusade against corruption in Nigeria. This research work directs attention to the unique role of this important organ of the emerging Nigerian democracy in the anti-corruption crusade.

### **Statement of Problem**

The 1999 constitution (as amended) of the federal republic of Nigeria, places enormous responsibility on the legislature as far as the control of public funds is concerned. Under it, there are constitutional, political and operational mechanisms specifically empowering the legislature to hold those saddled with the responsibility of executing laws made by it as well as expending resources appropriated by it accountable. The legislature is the main institution anchorage provided for in the constitution for the crusade against corruption (Mojeed & Joseph, 2010). It is also permitted by law to create other institutions and frameworks to assist it and the government in the discharge of that onerous duty. In fact, the legislature appeared sufficiently equipped under the constitution to serve as an effective check on the executive and its administrative agencies in all aspects of public administration. Yet, it appears that the National Assembly has been unable to adequately discharge the onerous duties devolved upon it by the constitution in this regard. In this scenario, the critical question that comes to mind is where lies the fault? Economic and financial corruption in the public sector results in redirecting resources from intended public use like education, health, works, and so on to illegitimate private benefit (Vincent & Kenneth 2017). Thus, the corrupt public official jeopardizes the security of the nation by causing massive human deprivation gravely affecting the livelihoods of the poor, weak and vulnerable members of the society. Corruption truncates government efforts to deliver qualitative service to its citizens (Nyewusira, 2007 in Nyewusira & Nweke, 2017). Nwosu (2011) in Nyewusira and Nweke (2017) consider this aspect of corruption as the mono-causal factor to the collapse of both the first and second republics in Nigeria.

According to Transparency International (TI) (2017) latest corruption perception index worldwide, Nigeria occupies 144 positions in the corruption ranking. This is a bad omen for a country with about 180 million population. While it has been acknowledged that the role of the legislature is important in curbing corruption, there has not been any attempt to examine how the 8<sup>th</sup> National Assembly in Nigeria has fared in the performance of the responsibility. To this end, this research work intends to examine the extent to which the 8th National Assembly has embarked on an anti-corruption crusade from 2015 to 2019

### **Objectives of the Study**

The general objective of this study is to assess the performance of the Nigerian legislature in the crusade against corruption. The specific objectives of this study are:

- (1) To examine the relevance of the Nigerian legislature in the anti-corruption crusade.
- (2) To examine if the Nigerian legislature has meaningfully contributed to the anti-corruption crusade from 2011 to 2019.

## **II. Theoretical Framework**

The Legislature is an administrative body responsible for making legislation for a country that articulates and reflects the people's common will or part of it (Nyewusira & Nweke; 2013). To analyze the National Assembly's success in combating corruption the study adopted Gabriel Almond functionalist theory. Structured-functionalism has anthropological origin through the work of Radcliffe Brown and Malinowski's early-twentieth-century philosophers. First, Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman built it as a political research tool in comparative politics. Almond is widely praised for a seminal interpretation of functionalism in political science (Mbah, 2006). Almond believes all political processes have the same role. According to Almond, the characteristics of all political systems are;

- All political systems have political structures
- The same functions are performed in all political systems with different frequencies and by different kinds of structures.
- All political structures are multi-functional.

- All political systems are mixed systems in the cultural sense, that is to say, that they are based in a culture that is always a mixture of modern and traditional (Mbah 2006, p.308).

Almond in Gauba (2009, p.112) maintains for every political system to work effectively, the system must perform the seven (7) crucial functions, which he divided into four (4) input functions; (1) political socialization and recruitment (2) interest articulation, (3) interest aggregation and political communication; output functions which are performed by formal governmental organs are; Rule making (legislature), rule-application (executive), and rule adjudication (judiciary).

According to Almond, the four input functions are usually performed by non-governmental organizations such as family, peers, faith community, social community, political parties, pressure groups etc. The three output functions performed by the three organs of government are highly significant because they stimulate by their demands and/or support the decisions and actions of the output functions.

The structural-functionalist sees bribery, coercion, influence peddling, nepotism, theft, "pace capital" or embezzlement as affecting the political systems triggered by the malfunctioning of any or all of the institutions or weapons or using Almond's terms "production variables," i.e., policy bodies. The theory suggests that where there is a breakdown in any organisation, it relays to and influences the other institutions. Manifestation of failure in political systems could be misery, deviant behaviour like crime, and corruption. In Nigeria today, corruption is one of the symptoms of our democratic institutions' malfunctioning. There is practically no sector or arm of government without corruption. Corruption is thus an indicator of operating institutions' failure leading to loss of dignity, responsibility, and openness in governance.

Paradoxically, however, structural-functionalist critics argue that corruption plays a developmental role. This anti-functionalist school of thought claims that while corruption is viewed as a perversion of dignity and socially acceptable conduct, it can act as a social development facilitator in society. Animashaun (2013) in his study on 'Corruption and National Development' suggests that stolen wealth is efficient as it can be used as a source of capital in country-building. Moreover, political corruption can be used to subvert red capitalism in the country. Political corruption for these scholars serves as a lubricant to grease the bureaucracy axle.

Nevertheless, the study argued that critique lacks merit and cannot be used to exonerate political corruption in our political system. Structural consistency has been exploited in the sense that no stolen money has ever been used to capitalize on any Nigerian initiative. The stolen money is often stashed away in foreign accounts like Nigerian looters. Therefore, the argument that corruption dissipates red-tapism is a fallacy. As observed, rather than dissipating red-tapes, corruption elongates the queue as actors become diverted from meeting their daily schedule in expectation of collecting or extorting payments from those they are paying to provide services (Corruption and National Growth, 2013).

### **III. State of the Art Review**

This heading is systematically structured to review some existing literature relating to the topic under investigation. Therefore, the literature to be reviewed is subtitled as follows: legislature, corruption and anti-corruption crusade.

#### **What is Corruption?**

To attempt a universally acceptable definition of the word corruption is a difficult task. The reason for this is that varying circumstances depending on the peculiarity and circumstances of an environment may result in determining whether a particular act was done with corrupt intent or not. In view of this, the absence of the definition of corruption in the provisions of some statutory criminal laws, like the Penal and Criminal Codes may be excusable. The word however has been defined in varying forms, by some authors, statutory provisions; while in some other statutory provisions instances of acts that may constitute corrupt practices are proffered. For instance, the Criminal Code and its counterpart the Penal Code does not define corruption, rather the Criminal Code only provides that an offence of corruption is committed where any public officer corruptly asks, receives or obtains any property or benefit. However, the Corrupt Practices Decree in section 1 gave a restricted definition of corruption by restricting it to bribery. To Garner, corruption is “the act of doing something with an intent to give some advantage inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others; a fiduciary’s or official’s use of a station or office to procure some benefit either personally or for someone else, contrary to the rights of others” (NALT, 2013). While to Carl Fredrick in NALT (2013) “...corruption is a deviant behaviour associated with a particular motivation, namely that of a private gain at public expense”. Corruption has also been defined as “efforts to secure wealth

or power through illegal means, private gain at public expense or a misuse of public power for private benefit". While to Nye, "corruption is a behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public role, because of private [gains]-regarding (personal, close family, private clique, pecuniary or status gains (NALT, 2013). It is a behaviour which violates rules against the exercise of certain types of [duties] for private [gains] - regarding influence". It must be stressed at this juncture that corruption is not limited to the political class.

However, the above definition presented how complicated the definition of corruption is. Corruption is a major social problem confronting this nation and has so affected our image that many leaders and writers say that, "Nigeria Stinks" (Ogudia, 2003, p.69). The unfortunate thing about the concept is that everyone believes he knows what corruption is. The concept is so confusing and all-embracing that the definition is blurred. Simply put, corruption according to the world book dictionary, "It is the act of making a process of becoming evil" (Ogudia, 2003, p.69) But according to Lexicon Webster dictionary in Ogudia (2003, p.69), it is the act of corrupting or the state of being corrupt, putrefactive, decomposition, putrid matter, moral pervasion, depravity, perversion of integrity, corrupt or dishonest proceedings, bribery, perversion from a state of purity, debasement, as of a language a debased form of a word.

The word corruption is very slippery and very situational or sometimes relative, thus very murky and with elastic definition. According to Dan (1992), it is wide, pervasive, all-encompassing to the point of impurity (confusing or blurred) understanding. In the above definition, there is the hint of evil and there is the hint of an innocent act, of merely bending the need in the direction of the wind. The confusing situation of the definition notwithstanding, the common consensus of what is undesirable and evil is still appreciated. Thus, Onigu (1997) acknowledge the problem out re-emphasizes the common value still exists, when he says, although the ambiguity and character are detained by different social and cultural context and time. Hence, corruption is in the eyes of the condemner and not in those of its beneficiaries. For example, when someone negotiates or demands a gift, which is sure to influence his judgment, he does not accept the interpretation that this is a bribe. It is not corruption to him, out merely a fee or the price of doing you a "Favour" (Ogudia 2001).

Onigu (2017) sees corruption as "the perversion of integrity or state of affairs through



bribery, favour or moral depravity". According to Ogudia (2001, p.71), "No society is spared by it", It percolates through vertical and horizontal structures of society. Nevertheless, Awortu and N-Ile (2014) see corruption literally as "to break away or depart from morality, ethics, tradition, law and civic virtue". In corroborating this view, Transparency International (2006) in Awortu and N-Ile (2014), sees corruption as "the dishonest or preferential use of power or position which has the result of one person or organization being advantageous over another". The World Bank summarizes corruption as "the abuse of public office for private gain "(Awortu & N-Ue, 014). According to Achebe (1933) corruption in Nigeria has passed the alarming and entered the fatal stage, and Nigeria will die if we keep pretending that she is only slightly indisposed. Aluko in Nalt, (2013) listed five types of corruption name as:

- 1) **Political Corruption:** perpetrated by political office-holders and their collaborators
- 2) **Economic/commercial:** corruption perpetrated by businessmen and contractors i.e. the private sector.
- 3) **Administrative/Professional:** corruption refers to deliberate acts by top administrative and professional personnel either in public or private enterprises.
- 4) **Organised corruption:** perpetrated by groups of the elite for the enrichment of those participating at the expense of the society. Examples are hoarding, price-fixing, racketeering, smuggling, burglary, armed robbery and advance fee fraud.
- 5) **Working class corruption:** This is similar to those of the administrative /professional type except for the status of the perpetrators e.g. artisans, messengers, market women and so on. To Thiankolu (2015), the variants of corruption include Grand Corruption, Political Corruption, Corporate Corruption, Administrative Corruption and Petty Corruption. From the foregoing, it is safe to infer that corruption is using power or position entrusted to a person whether public or private for selfish or personal gain to achieve a purpose not envisaged by such power. Broadly defined, corruption is the abuse of not only the public office but also private or commercial office for private gain. It invariably involves giving something to someone in a position of power either in government or in a corporation, so that he will (abuse his power and act in a manner favouring the giver). It involves the offering, giving, soliciting or acceptance of an inducement or reward, which may influence the action of any person." Corrupt practices manifest themselves in varying forms like bribery, embezzlement,

nepotism, fraud, extortion, favouritism, electoral fraud, rigging, rent-seeking, sexual harassment, and examination malpractice amongst others.

### **Legislature (National Assembly)**

Another name for the legislature is parliament. In America, the legislature is called the congress, while in Nigeria the legislature is called the National Assembly. A member of the legislature in America is called a congressman while in Nigeria is called an Honorable member or a senator if he belongs to the house of the senate. In Britain, a member of the legislature is called a parliamentarian or a legislature (Nwankwo, 2002). There is parliamentary or legislative supremacy in Britain or the United Kingdom. By this, we mean that there is no sphere of government which parliament may not legislate, there is no law which it may not repeal or amend. According to Dicey in Nwankwo (2002, p.95), ‘Parliament can do anything except make men women and women men’. This places them in the trajectory of an anti-corruption crusade. However, legislative supremacy is limited by the attitude of the electorates and the desire of the majority of members of parliament to continue in office (Nwankwo, 2002, p.95). Then, what is legislature?

The legislature has been described as a political institution comprising of members whose members are “formally equal to one another, whose authority derives from a claim that the members are representatives of the political community, and whose decisions are collectively made according to complex procedures” (NALT, 2013). Loewenberg in NALT (2013) posited that “legislatures are assemblies of elected representatives from geographically defined constituencies, with law-making functions in the governmental process.” In a similar vein, Garner in NALT (2013) defines legislature as “the branch of government responsible for making statutory laws. McLean & McMillan (2009:303) see legislature as a law-making assembly of elected members in a formally equal relationship to one another. Legislatures evolved from medieval bodies periodically assembled by the King to agree to levies of taxation to bodies which sat more or less continuously, or least claimed the right to do as did seventeenth-century English parliaments. The legislature, therefore, took its modern form in the work of Locke and the parliaments he had in mind (McLean & McMillan, 2009, p.303).

According to Cletus (2001, p.74), law making is the primary task of this organ, it also performs some extra legislative functions such as involvement in the amending of the

constitution, control of executive officials, impeachment or disciplinary actions on public servants, use of funds, general supervision of the executive duties of a government. It is clear from the foregoing that legislature is an important political institution. In Nigeria, it comprises the national assembly and states houses of assembly, and local government councils' legislative assemblies which make laws called by-laws for local government areas (Gahia, 2012; Cletus, 2001; Newkw 2006; Okoli, 2003; Nwankwo, 2002).

The National Assembly is a bicameral legislature made up of the House of Senate, the senior chamber and the House of Representatives, the lower house. The Arrange reflects the American system under which there is a congress comprising the Senate, the senior chamber and the House of Representatives, the lower chamber (Gahia, 2012). According to him, in practice, the two chambers are equal. This underpins a compromise between equality and the advantage of number (Gahia, 2012). In the Nigerian senate, states, some of which are small in size, have an equal number of seats each state, irrespective of its geographical size and population, has three senatorial districts (seats). This enhances the equality of the federating states. This principle helps in jettison the fear of the minority or smaller states. According to Gahia (2012, p.32), the issue of number which the principle of equal representation of states attempts to balance is underpinned by the fact that the House of Representatives represents the generality of the people based on population differentials of states as reflected in the number of constituencies given each state. Thus, the advantage of number which the house enjoys be virtue of the population strengths of states is compensated for by the seniority of the senate over the house reflected in the precedence accorded senate president in joint sittings of the national assembly, his right of succession to the presidency where, as a result of death, impeachment or other disqualification there is no president or vice president (Gahia, 2012, p.2). The third recognition of senate seniority lies in its power to ratify treaties, authorize war, and confirmation of ministerial and ambassadorial appointments. From the above, it is safe to adopt within the context of this study that legislatures are those elected representatives of the people either in the National or States Houses of Assemblies saddled with the responsibility of making laws for the good governance of the country as provided and consistent with the provisions of the Constitution.

### **The function of the National Assembly**

Nigerian National Assembly performs the following functions:

- 1) The national assembly makes law and by so doing, guide and directs the affairs of the nation
- 2) The national assembly amends the constitution when the need arises.
- 3) The national assembly (senate) endorses appointments made by the president
- 4) It controls and approves the financial expenditure of the executive arm.
- 5) The national assembly (senate) ratifies treaties entered into by the president.
- 6) The national assembly engages in fact findings probe functions by setting up panels to probe some organs of government to find out how they work, especially in the case of financial misappropriation of funds.
- 7) The national assembly enlightens and educates the populace in matters of public interest.
- 8) The national assembly could remove or recommend for removal the chief justice of the federation
- 9) The national assembly could remove or impeach the president when he is no longer performing
- 10) It acts as a check on the function of the executive to avoid misrule or executive rascality.
- 11) Through its various activities, the legislature serves as a training grand for future leaders, (Cletus, 2001; Okoli, 2003; Gahia, 2012; Nweke, 2006; Nweke, 2013).

### **III. Research Methodology**

**Research Design:** A research design is a collection of methods and procedures used to capture and analyze the variables defined in the research problem. To produce data needed to check and verify our theories, we relied on the qualitative approach. The conceptual approach is used to acquire in-depth knowledge and definition, to promote instrument designs. It is well adapted for qualitative research (Biereenu, 2006:372 in Aneke 2012). A qualitative approach is especially helpful in collecting, highlighting and analyzing relevant knowledge to draw inferences from available data to reach a conclusion. The benefits of the qualitative

approach were that it was "capable of obtaining exposure to corporate structure, institutional procedures ... more readily contributing to the detection of the unknown phenomena" (Obikeze in Aneke 2012). The research is also focused on secondary data and library resources. It was partly due to the complexity of this analysis and, on the one hand, the types of data needed in examining the phenomenon under investigation. The data processing approach is based on content analysis.

## V. Data Analysis

### The Issue of Corruption and the Nigerian Cases

The issue and act of corruption are not alien in Nigeria and to Nigerians. However, the emergence of official corrupt practices in the country is traced to the time of the establishment of modern structures of public administration in the country by the British Colonial Administration (Olutola & Oyeleke, 2016). Ample evidence exists to establish that corruption occurs in all spheres of human endeavours in the country. Hence, the Transparency International Annual Corruption Perception Index that many times consistently rated Nigeria as one of the most corrupt, and at another time the most corrupt nation in the world. As accentuated above, corruption cuts across class, religion, sex, and creed. The vice is not limited to the public sector alone; findings from the social surveys have shown that the private sector is not immune from practices associated with corruption. The issue of corruption has become a growing concern for all and it is not unconnected with prevailing social, political, economic and historical factors in the society (Mbeki 1999 & Mogae 1999; Dike, 2001; Akanbi 2004).

In Nigeria, corruption has been acknowledged on many fronts as the single most important factor reversing democratic gains and development (ICPC, 2006). The vice is not also seen in the country as a threat to democracy but also perceive to undermine economic development, violate social justice, and destroy trust in state institutions. The evil called corruption attracts myriad problems and its effects are manifold. Indeed, the cost of corruption in the country is hard to calculate, but the best estimates as evident in the works of social surveyors indicate that corruption undermines democratic institutions, slows economic development and more importantly contributes to governmental instability (Ayobolu, 2006).

Another poisonous effect of corruption is its' overwhelming attacks on the foundation of democratic institutions by distorting electoral processes, perverting the rule of law and creating bureaucratic quagmires that only exist for the purpose of soliciting bribes. Economic development is stunted because foreign direct investment is discouraged and small businesses within the country often find it impossible to overcome the "start-up costs" required because of corruption. Also, in Nigeria, a broad spectrum of findings from social research has shown the colossal negative impact of corruption on the country's economy in the form of inefficiency, lack of a culture of accountability, weak government structures; excessive concentration of power in the various arms of government and lack of transparency, shameless act of stealing of public funds and properties, wasteful mismanagement of national resources and public assets is closely associated with failure on the part of politics and politicians (U.N. 1990; Olutola & Oyeleke, 2016; Sachs, 2007).

As established above, official corruption in Nigeria is not a novel practice. A considerable amount of bribery, nepotism and the use of political office for personal enrichment existed in late colonial Nigeria. In fact, various allegations of maladministration and dishonesty were the reasons the then Colonial Government set up a commission headed by Bernard Storey to investigate the activities of Lagos Town Council. The ensuing report contained the first extended public discussion of widespread corrupt administrative practices in Nigeria. The outcome of the report culminated in the removal of the then Lagos town councillors from office and the resultant installation of a caretaker administration by the western regime (Tignor, 1993).

In the same vein, an investigation conducted in Southern, Eastern and Northern parts of the country revealed that most parts of these aforementioned regions were affected by allegations of systematic corruption and dishonesty. For example, Tignor claimed that the inquiries conducted by British observers (O.P. Gunning for the eastern part and Nicholson commission for the western part of the country) referred to the actions of the then premier, Dr Azikwe as being far from sort of the expectations of honest and reasonable people, while Nicholson commission indicted National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (N.C.N.C.) politician, and the leader of the Ibadan District Council Adegoke Adelabu, of corruption. This resulted in Adelabu's resignation and was later banned from serving in ministerial capacities. Although, there were no British appointed commissions of inquiry or any published report

indicting individual politicians in the Northern part of the country, nevertheless Abubakar Balewa, who later became Nigeria's first Prime Minister, in 1950 publicly condemned bribery and corruption in the region.

For many in Nigeria, corruption is best regarded as ill-wind which blows ordinary citizens no good; it is always trailed by throes of destruction. In Nigeria, the phenomenon to a great extent has contributed significantly to low success (both politically and economically) as recorded in the First Republic (1960 - 1966) and the Second Republic (1979 -1983). Also, the military highlighted unprecedented cases of corruption that characterized the democratic dispensations as the justification for overthrowing the democratically elected government. Nonetheless, in 1999, the military rulers who had cited corruption as the major reason the democratically elected governments were sacked from office were also accused and found guilty of corruption (Tignor, 2013). A typical example of corruption during the early military era in Nigeria was that of Yakubu Gowon administration, a regime where ten out of the twelve military administrators were all indicted of corruption. Corruption in Nigeria is illegal though it is rife among Nigerians, especially among the political class. There exist relevant constitutional provisions for the three arms of the government to help nip corruption in the bud through the proper discharge of their responsibilities and functions in the country. But of all these, the role of the legislature appears all-encompassing and more important (Olutola & Oyeleke, 2016).

### **Causes and Consequences of Corruption**

There are divergent views on the causes of corruption. While some scholars like Aluko blame it on colonialism, others like Adjibolosoo and Mbaku in NALT (2013), argue that political corruption has a cultural dimension. The person with a high position in Nigeria is beset with requests for favours from extended family members. Such a leader is the cynosure of all eyes at events and festivals in his hometown and he is seen as the panacea to all family maladies and wants and he is pressed for favours till all possible privileges are exploited and abused leading steadily to his or her fall and disgrace. Undue adulation of leaders and sycophancy has been part of Nigeria's woes. Nigerians have praised their leaders when there is no need for praise, have approved and concurred when they should have questioned and cautioned, have flattered and cajoled till they almost lost their heads. According to Olutola and Oyeleke,

(2016, p.21) corruption:

Tends to be higher in countries at lower levels of economic and human development, with lower levels of education, limited political rights, weak or non-existent political competition, a relatively large state role in the economy, lower levels of economic freedom and openness, ethnolinguistic factionalism, the lack of judicial independence and a free press, low civil service wages, abundant natural resource endowments, low levels of interpersonal trust, and high levels of permissiveness toward corruption, among other.

It has also been empirically tested that the impact of corruption in every nation reveals an assortment of toxic economic and political consequences. Studies demonstrate that corruption lowers the rate of economic growth and investment, distorts public spending by diverting funds to sectors where the collection of bribes is easier such as physical public investments and military spending, weakens programs designed to help the poor and reduce inequality, reduces government revenue through tax evasion and improper tax exceptions, lowers foreign aid and influences the structure of trading partners. Politically, corruption reduces the public's trust in politicians and civil servants, their faith in public institutions, evaluations of government performance and regime legitimacy. The impact of corruption is seen in decay in the Nigerian infrastructure such as the power sector, educational institutions, roads, communications and other social amenities inefficient and ineffective security outfits, and many others. Public utilities like the Nigerian Telecommunications Plc (NITEL) and the Nigerian Railway Corporation (NRC) became moribund. Thus corruption has distorted and retrogressed national development. Although it may be difficult to estimate in exact terms the amount of money the country has lost through corrupt and sharp practices, it is estimated that trillions of naira have been stolen from governments coffers. According to Nuhu Ribadu (ex-chairman of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission), about \$220 billion (about N65 trillion) was stolen by past Nigerian leaders within the 46 years of independence. This shows among others that the cost of corruption is great and is the most threatening danger to stability and sustainable development in Nigeria.

The use of stolen money in political campaigns and in corrupting electoral process has weakened the electorates' faith in democracy. People no longer see government as their own and the legitimacy of the government in power is put into question. Corruption erodes the



confidence of the citizens as well as the foreigners in government. Indeed, the corrupted democratic process has given room to autocratic rule a total disregard for the rule of law. The high incidence of politically motivated assassinations and kidnap of prominent people are all outcomes of a corrupt political system in Nigeria. The political system has been corruptly manipulated to weaken opposition to the disadvantage of the citizens.

### **National Assembly and Anti-Corruption Crusade**

Anti-corruption crusade comprises activities that oppose or inhibit corruption. Just as corruption takes many forms, anti-corruption crusades vary in scope and strategy. A legal and moral framework to fight against corruption has been created. At the national and international levels, there are laws enacted directly against corruption. These laws can be stern from resolutions of international organizations, which are implemented by the national governments or be directly the issues by the respective national legislature. Laws against corruption are motivated by similar reasons that are generally motivating the existence of criminal law, as those laws are thought to, on the one hand, bring justice holding individuals accountable for their wrong doing, justice can be achieved by sanctioning those corrupted individuals, and potential criminals are deterred by having the consequences of their potential actions demonstrated to them (Wikipedia, 2019).

The major fight against corruption is carried out through the process of lawmaking. Section 4 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as Amended) provides that the Legislature is empowered to make laws for the good governance of the nation, which includes enacting anti-corruption legislation that criminalizes corruption and provides for the appropriate punishment for offenders. Under the legislative function, Section 4 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 provides to the effect that the National Assembly shall have the power to make laws for peace, order and good government of the country. More specifically, under Section 15 (5) of the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy, it provides, "The state shall abolish all corrupt practices and abuse of office". Again in Section 2 (2) (b) and (c)' the government is enjoined to harness the resources of the nation for the common good and to prevent the concentration of wealth or the means of production and exchange in the hands of few individuals or of a group.

The responsibility of fashioning the legal framework for the fight against corruption and

corrupt practices is thereby vested in the legislature. In the exercise of this mandate, the National Assembly has enacted the Code of Conduct Bureau and Code of Conduct Tribunal, The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act 2002 and The Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission Act 2000 to investigate and prosecute Public Officers and other persons suspected of involvement in corrupt practices. In both legislations, the Commissions are given extensive powers of investigation and prosecution to deal with all cases of corrupt practices and abuse of office that may arise. Concerning the specific objective of injecting transparency and accountability in the management of the resources of the nation, the National Assembly enacted the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2007 and the Public Procurement Act 2007. Both legislations make copious provisions aimed at engendering transparency and accountability in the public space. According to Tambuwal (2013), the provisions of these legislations and indeed others were diligently enforced significant milestones would have been accomplished in the fight against corruption and corrupt practices in Nigeria. Sadly however these Legislations are observed more in the breach by the majority including government and government agencies.

In short, almost every government in Nigeria since 1960 has promised to raise ethical standards and restore accountability and transparency in governance. But against this stance, massive looting of the nation's wealth and resources by high ranking state officials has remained a permanent feature of the country's political life. To help combat corruption and its damaging consequences in both formal and informal sectors in Nigeria, several successive governments, beginning from the colonial era till the Nigerian eight republic (a republic that came to be on May 29, 2015, as a result of the swearing-in of elected President Muhammed Buhari) adopted myriad governmental policies and legal instruments. Chief among these anti-corruption policies, decrees and legislations are the Criminal Code, Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous provision) Decree in 1966, Code of Conduct Bureau, the Recovery of Public Property Act of 1984 and Economic and Financial Crimes Commission and Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (the EFCC and the ICPC). Whistle blower bill, mutual assistance in criminal matter bill, anti-money laundering bill, witness protection bill, Nigerian Financial Intelligent Unit (NFIU) bill and so on. Without a doubt, the contributions of legislatures (members of the National Assembly and their counterparts in various states of the federation in Nigeria) to the making of the

aforementioned legislations and legal instruments in Nigeria cannot be overemphasized. It is also instructive to know that the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria vested on the National Assembly the legislative power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Federation or any part thereof concerning any matter included in the Exclusive Legislative List and to make laws concerning any matter in the Concurrent Legislative List and concerning any other matter to which it is empowered to make laws following the provisions of the constitution (See section 4(2) and (3) of the 1999 Constitution). In short, the functions of legislators under the 1999 constitution are stated as follows:

- (i) making of law and formulation of policies,
- (ii) oversight functions,
- (iii) investigative functions,
- (iv) constituency responsibilities role and
- (v) watchdog role over public funds (Nyewusira, & Nweke, 2017).

As part of the process of making Laws, each House of the National Assembly is given the power to summon before it and question any minister about the conduct of his ministry, particularly when the affairs of that ministry are under consideration. The power is given to the National Assembly in subsection (2) of section 67 which provides that: "A minister of the Government of the Federation shall attend either House of the National Assembly if invited to explain to the House the conduct of his Ministry, and in particular when the affairs of that Ministry are under discussion". A similar power is given to a State House of Assembly in subsection (2) of section 108 with respect to state commissioners. In addition to law-making, the upper chamber of the National Assembly is given a confirmatory role in certain appointments made by the President, such as those of the Chief Justice of Nigeria and other senior judicial officers, ministers, ambassadors, chairmen and members of certain executive bodies created for the Federation in section 153, requiring confirmation in section 154, of the Constitution. A declaration of war by Nigeria or of an emergency, whether in one State or in the Federation as a whole, also requires confirmation by the Senate.

In a nutshell, sections 80 and 81 of the 1999 Constitution empowers members of the legislative This arm of the government has to protect the public funds and other resources that accrue into the coffers of the government, thereby making this arm of the government the controller of the national treasury in Nigeria. Also, members of the National Assembly have been constitutionally empowered to monitor the appropriation of funds for public expenditures and also to see to the judicious utilisation of these funds.

In addition to the above, the 1999 constitution empowers the Legislative Arm of the Government (National Assembly members) to check the excesses of the executive arm of the government and make it more accountable to the people (Nyewusira & Nweke, 2017). The foregoing constitutional provisional powers of the Legislative Arm of the Government of Nigeria as stipulated in the 1999 constitution have shown that the National Assembly, more than any other arm of the government, is vested with the power to uphold the highest standards of ethics, also to be transparent, accountable, efficient and, under whatever condition, lead by example. Without a doubt and in principle, these powers vested in the legislative arm of the government as stipulated in the constitution have ultimately turned this arm of the government into a necessary and much-needed instrument for exposing and preventing corruption in the country by enacting legislation that would tackle corruption and thereby enthrone stable democratic rule in the country. This provision places the Nigerian Legislature at the tabernacle of the anti-corruption crusade.

### **National Assembly and the Crisis of Anti-corruption Crusade in Nigeria**

Nigerian legislators are supposed to be the hunters in the anti-corruption crusade, but the reverse is the case. The corruption taking place in both the National and State Assemblies was a result of the involvement and collaboration of the leadership of both houses. In the first republic, the then Senate President, Ewerem, was removed from office in 1999 and replaced with Senator Chuba Okadigbo, because it was alleged that he collected N25 million for the purchase of furniture and also received a bribe of N6 million from the street light contract. In the same period, the Senate President, who replaced Evans Ewerem, Chuba Okadigbo and his deputy, Haruna Abubakar, were impeached because the Senate President allocated to himself

the sum of N37.2 million as furniture allowance; bought cars for N30 million; received N29 million for Christmas; approved N600 million as consultancy fees; and N70 million for the construction of an office complex and the purchase of ram. His deputy (Haruna Abubakar) received N16.9 million for Christmas and N3.2 million for Sallah. Other allegations include a \$175 million contract for the street lightning of Eagle Square instead of the N57 million estimated by the Federal Capital Territory and a \$7 million spent on gardening (hip-hip for the green party). These contracts were given to unregistered companies (Ogoh, 2000). When Chuba Okadigbo was removed as Senate President, he was replaced by Senator Pius Ayim as Senate President. Pius Ayim was also accused of engaging in some shady business dealings, including awarding contracts for N15.9 million for the supply of the national flag, N4.8 million for the repair of a car attached to his office, N917.82 million for the purchase of Peugeot 406 cars for Senators, and collecting N10.29 million as east code allowance. (Ogoh, 2000). Ghali Umar Na'Abba was a former Speaker of the House of Representatives. He was alleged to have mismanaged N20 million meant for the construction of a press centre and also collected an overdraft of N1.5 billion, together with approving for himself the sum of N22.9 million (Okoro, 2002). Another former Speaker, Patricia Olubumi Etteh, who was the first female Speaker in Nigeria, was impeached because she approved the sum of N238 million renovation contract for her official quarters without going through due process. She also approved the sum of N600 million for the purchase of a body massage machine (Abimboye, 2011). Dimeji Bankole, who took over as Speaker from Patricia Etteh, was equally alleged to have misappropriated N9 billion out of N11 billion in capital votes of the House of Representatives in 2008/2009 Budget for corrupt practices. He also took a bank loan of N10 billion to finance the activities of the house without the knowledge of the members (Abimboye, 2011).

The 8th Senate, which was inaugurated on the 9th of June 2015, seems not to be at par with the mood of the Nigerian public because, in the midst of the economic hardship afflicting Nigerians, the Senate imported 36 sports utility vehicles at twice the original price, each at N36.5 million. But in defending the action of the Senate, Senator Ibrahim Gobir, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Senate Services, said: "The Upper House never spent over N4 billion to purchase 108 cars for law-makers as alleged in some quarters." Only 36 SUVs were

bought at a cost of N36.5 million each. We had a close session and they agreed that we should have one car per state; we sat down and agreed on who among the three senators from each state needed the car the most, and that is what happened (Williams, 2015). Senator Gobir dismissed the criticism from Nigerians about the Senate's insensitivity in spending such money on cars, given the country's economic challenges. He then said: "Come to think of it, there is no Minister that has not got about three or four cars – one Land Cruiser, which may be a backup, and two Hilux cars." There is no director in the civil service that hasn't got a car. There is no Permanent Secretary that doesn't have a Land Cruiser. In fact, every House of Assembly member has either a Prado or a Land Cruiser, and here is a Senator. You say he cannot have one Land Cruiser" (Williams, 2015). The above scenario displays the intention of Nigerian lawmakers to satisfy their selfish interests without considering the country first in their activities. Another example of deep-seated corruption in the National Assembly is the Ministerial Nomination and Bill Passage.

### **Ministerial Nominee, Bill passage and Corruption in the National Assembly**

It has been alleged that Nigerian Legislators at the Upper chamber (Senate) do demand bribes from ministerial nominees to facilitate their clearance at the Senate. These allegations came to the view when a Ministerial Nominee during the era of President Obasanjo, Mallam Nasir El-Rufai, alleged that Senator Ibrahim Mantu and Senator Jonathan Zwingina requested him to pay the sum of N54 million bribes to facilitate his clearance at the Senate. Also, another Ministerial Nominee, Miss Funke Adedoyi was told to play N100 million, but an official in the Presidency then, who was very close to her, provide some part of the money. Furthermore, Prof. Babalola Borishade, a former Minister of Education was equally approached by some Senators to pay them N50 million to facilitate his clearance (Akintunde, 2003). In 2011, the House of Representatives was expected to pass the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB), which was earlier passed by the Senate. But the Multinational companies were fighting seriously to ensure that the bill if passed at all should be in their favour. Because of this, there was an allegation that the Lawmakers were given the sum of 10 million dollars to pass the PIB in a form that will favour the Oil companies (Umaru, 2017). Also, the Legislators were alleged to have demanded the sum of N600 million before they would agree to pass the Sovereign Wealth Bill (SWB), which seek to promote fiscal discipline and ensure

better utilization of excess crude profit. The Bill was sponsored by the Presidency (Suleiman, 2011).

In the same vein, Representative Farouk Lawan and Mr Emenalo Boniface collected a \$3 million bribe to ensure that Zenon Petroleum and Gas Ltd. Escape prosecution, even though the committee had abinitio found it culpable in fuel subsidy fraud. An offence which is contrary to Section 17(1) (a); 8(1) (a) (b) (ii), and 23 (i) of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000 and punishable under Section 8(1) 17(10 and 23(3) of the same Act. Hon. Farouk Lawan was the Chairman of the House of Representative Ad hoc Committee on Monitoring of Fuel Subsidy. He corruptly obtained for himself \$500,000 from Mr Femi Odetola, Chairman of Zenon Petroleum and Gas Ltd. As an inducement to remove the name of Zenon Petroleum and Gas Ltd. From the report of the House of Representatives. Also, Mr Emenalo Boniface, a public official and an Assistant Director, who was the Secretary of the Committee received from Mr Femi Odetola the sum of \$300,000 for himself (Nnochiri, 2013).

### **Corruption Twist in the National Assembly**

Table 2 contained the names of some of Nigeria's 8th National Assembly members, inaugurated on the 9th of June 2015, whose previous actions fall within the provision of Section 66(1 a-i), i.e. they are facing criminal and sundry charges which cast doubts on their integrity.

<b>S/N</b>	<b>Name of Legislators Criminal Allegations</b>	<b>Criminal Allegations of corruption</b>
1	David Mark	Court papers in London showed that in the early 2000s, He operated foreign accounts with six million pounds: three at the Northern Bank, Isle of Man, and one at the Allied Irish Bank, Jersey.
2	Hon. Iorwase Hembe and Hon. Ifeanyi Azubuogu	The duo was accused by the former Director-General of the Security and Exchange Commission of demanding N39 million bribes and an additional N5 million, during the probe of the near-collapse capital market in 2012.
3	Senator Bukola	He was alleged to have violated Nigeria's Money Laundering laws as a

	Saraki	result of the consistent stealing of public funds through his assistant, Abdul Adama and other staff who helped him in laundering the monies in bits. They were recommended for prosecution for offences relating to Money Laundering Act and Forex (Monitoring and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act. The former Attorney General and Minister of Justice, Mohammed Adoke directed the Inspector-General of Police to stop further investigation.
4	Senator Theodore Orji	Senator Theodore Orji The Senator was linked to the withdrawal of N5.6 billion in cash from Abia State accounts in the Guarantee Trust Bank, against the regulation of the Central Bank. He was the conduit through which Abia state was defrauded during the 8-year reign of his godfather, Kalu. He was in the detention of the EFCC when he won the Governorship election in Abia State, he was released because of constitutional immunity. He is yet to be cleared.
5	Senator Danjuma Goje	A former Governor of Gombe State. He was alleged to have stolen the sum of N52 billion Gombe State funds. He was charged to court by the EFCC. The case is ongoing.
6	Senator Goodhope Uzodimma	He allegedly transferred funds from the account of the National Maritime Authority to the former Head of State, General Abdulsalami Abubakar. He also collected a N250 million mobilization fee, which he made a refund. He was detained by the EFCC when one of his companies – Transurb Technical Consult Ltd – went bankrupt. He is yet to be cleared of any of these allegations.
7	Senator Adamu Aliero	He was a former Governor of Kebbi State. He was alleged to have stolen N10.2 billion funds of the State. He is yet to be cleared of the charges by the EFCC and ICPC.
8	Senator Abdul Azeez Murtala Nyako	He was the son of the former Governor of Adamawa State. He was accused of stealing, abuse of office and money laundering by the EFCC. He was being investigated for laundering N15 billion State Government money to the account of five companies belonging to him: Blue opal Nig. Ltd., Crust Energy Nig. Ltd., Blue Ribbon Multilinks Ltd., Tower Assets Mgt. Ltd., and Blue Ribbon Bureau De Change. He was elected to make laws for Nigerians.



9	Senator Ali Ndume	The Nigerian government had alleged that he has links with the insurgent group, Boko Haram and that he furnished the sect with information that aided their operations in the country. He was arraigned before an Abuja High court by the federal government on a four-count criminal charge and tendered proof of evidence that indicated the lawmaker made contacts with the Boko Haram sect 73 times. He is yet to be cleared of the charges.
10	Senator Stella Odua	Allegation of certificate forgery i.e. forged MBA and Ph.D certificates and was also indicted for corruption by the House of Representatives when she approved the illegal purchase of two armoured BMW cars for a whopping sum of N255 million. She has not been cleared of the allegations.
11	Senator Sam Egwu	He was accused of stealing billions of funds belonging to Ebonyi State when he was the Governor. He gave a false declaration of asset. The EFCC arrested and detained the former Accountant General of the State but the former governor was not touched.
12	Senator Buruji Kashamu	He is wanted by the United States government for alleged drug-related offences. Senator Kashamu and 14 others were charged in 1998 for their alleged involvement in an international conspiracy to smuggle heroin into the US. Also, the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency placed him under house arrest in an attempt to extradite him to the US. The matter is still before a court.
13	Senator Joshua Dariye	He was arrested by the Metropolitan Police on 20th January 2004 in London with over \$9 million. While on bail, he escaped to Nigeria and has since not gone back to clear himself of the money laundering charges the British Government brought against him. On July 13, 2007, he was arraigned on a 23 count charge of money laundering and theft of billions of naira by the EFCC. His appeal to the Supreme court was dismissed and ordered to go back to the high court to face his trial. But he headed to the Senate to make laws for Nigerians
	Senator Abdullahi Adamu	He was a former Governor of Nasarawa State. He was arrested by the EFCC in 2010 over allegations of fraudulent award of contracts and stealing of public funds estimated at N15 billion. He was arraigned by

		the EFCC on a 149 count charge of fraud, he made several attempts to the courts to drop the charges against him but to no avail. He is also in the Senate making laws for Nigerians.
--	--	--

Source: Umaru, (2017).

The high profiles of Nigerian lawmakers involve in cases of corruption make some scholars ponder on the justification of the National Assembly anti-corruption crusade. Thus, one can describe the anti-corruption crusade of the 8<sup>th</sup> National Assembly as nothing other than a symbolic media crusade that is doomed to dissipate with grievous consequences on the general masses of Nigerians.

### **Corruption and Budget Padding in the Nigerian National Assembly**

Budget Padding has various meanings attached to it. Padding is defined as using soft materials to give comfort or dishonestly make bills more expensive than they should be (Drenkat, 2016). Padding also means making the budget proposal larger than the actual estimates for the project. This is done either by increasing a project's expenses or decreasing its expected revenue. The goal of project padding is to get an approval committee to grant an artificially high level of funding to the budget maker's proposed project. The issue of Budget Padding came to view when the Presidency of the Federal Republic of Nigeria accused the 8th National Assembly of Padding its 2016 Budget with N500 billion, far above the revenue projection and built-in deficit, thus making it impossible for the President to implement the budget, going by the country's economic downturn. Apart from padding the budget, the Lawmakers were also alleged to have included projects such as the provisions of boreholes, town halls, football pitches as their constituency project to be funded by the Federal Government (Williams, 2016). The erstwhile Chairman, House Committee on Appropriation, Representative Abdulmunini Jibrin, who was sacked by the leadership of the House, blew the whistle on padding the budget and stated that the padding was done after the President signed the bill into law. Abdulmunini alleged that ten (10) House of Representative Committee Chairmen padded their respective committees budget to the collective tune of N280 billion. He further stated that the Speaker of the 8th Assembly, Honourable Yakubu Dogara and three other principal officers unduly pressurized him to appropriate additional N40 billion constituency projects arbitrarily and disproportionately in their favour (Drenkat, 2016).

Reacting to the allegation of Honourable Abdulmumini Jibrain, former President Olusegun Obasanjo stated that Jibrin's allegation of padding has finally vindicated him when he said that rogues and armed robbers were in the national and state houses of assembly. The former president, therefore, advised President Muhammadu Buhari to be wary of the lawmakers and that Nigerians should vote credible people into parliament (Williams, 2016). While in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, President Muhammadu Buhari vowed that those involved in the padding of the 2016 budget will be verily punished, because the unauthorized alterations had completely changed the document from the one presented to the Assembly. The President asserted that:

The culprits will not go unpunished. I have been a Military Governor, Petroleum Minister, and Military Head of State and headed the Petroleum Trust Fund. Never had I heard the words "budget padding." Our Minister of Budget and National Planning did a great job with his team. The Minister became almost half of his size during the time, working night and day to get the budget ready, only for some people to pad it. What he gave us was not what was finally being debated. It is very embarrassing and disappointing. We will not allow those who did it to go unpunished (Williams, 2016, p.4).

The above situation demonstrated that things have fallen apart in Nigeria. The legislature that is supposed to be the vanguard of the anti-corruption crusade is entangled with the cases of corruption to the extent the National budgets are being manipulated in line with the individual interest of the key members.

On his return from Saudi Arabia, President Muhammadu Buhari deployed twenty-two (22) directors from, the various budget units of the concerned ministries, departments and agencies were deployed. The former Budget Officer of the Federation was also removed (Williams, 2016). Assessing Legislature's Performance in Anti-Corruption Crusade in Nigeria Stapenhurst, Ulrich and Strohal (2006) identify three legislative prongs with which to combat corruption in a democratic society. The necessity for the deployment of the weapons-law making, oversight and representational roles- is contingent on the fact that in a functional democracy, citizens look to their parliament. This is due largely to the fact that the enormous economic and social costs of corruption are borne by the poor citizens. As Mathekga (2008) avers, parliament is indeed the right institution to ensure the accountability of the executive.

By extension, the expansive administrative agencies of the state equally come under the ambit of the executive arm over which the legislature is expected to oversee to ensure accountability. The first area where an effective anti-corruption war may be waged by the assembly is combating corruption through law-making. Although writers on the anti-corruption role of the legislatures have identified a series of constraints that anti-corruption legislation could face, nevertheless, two key areas are seen as where legislative intervention could help to reduce corruption. One is enacting laws to address what they consider appropriate behaviour by both individuals and organizations. Stapenhurst, Ulrich and Strohal equally advocate the inclusion of medium of surveillance and penalties in the law so enacted. The second area where the legislative role is considered desirable is focusing on bolstering integrity in governance.

Assessing the Nigerian legislature on the basis of the first criterion, which is law making; the legislature appears weak and incapable of effectively utilizing its law-making power to curb corruption. The legislature appeared bereft of an initiative to tackle corruption. This is evident in the dearth of ideas as well as the ineffectiveness of the legislature to push its initiative on anti-corruption through. For instance, out of the five bills on anti-corruption over which the lower chamber deliberated upon between 1999 and 2003, the executive initiated three, while the remaining two originated from the lower chamber. Worthy of note, however, is that one of the two private members initiatives was a proposed amendment to the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Bill 2000. The private member bills could not achieve their aims as they were not passed by the house. Although the inability of the legislature could not have been due to lack of power to act, rather the assembly appears to be deficient in the *political will* (Mark, 2009). Apart from this, the legislators have consistently demonstrated that their interests overrode national interests. The initial resistance and reluctance of the legislature to pass the ICPC Act 2000 rightly lend credence to this (IRIN Africa, 2009). Furthermore, out of the eleven bills on anti-corruption that the lower chamber received between 2003 and 2007, the executive was responsible for nine. One of the nine bills was a United Nations convention against crime. From available records, eight of the executive bills were passed while one was killed (negative). The remaining two bills which originated from the house did not pass. It is important to point out, however, that apart from the Economic and Financial Crime Commission Amendment (EFCC) Bill 2004, all other

anti-corruption bills emanating from the lower chamber of the central legislature during the period were proposed amendments to previous Acts. In the Senate, about ten bills relating to anti-corruption were received between 2003 and 2007. This was the period when the government mustered concerted efforts to put in place a necessary legal framework for combating corruption in Nigeria. The executive accounted for about eight out of which five were passed. The two private member bills, one of which sought to amend an executive bill on money laundering, failed. It suffices to mention that all the bills received by both chambers were just on three areas- ICPC, EFCC and money laundering. Surprisingly a bold effort of the United Nation to criminalize corruption through the UN convention on the corruption of 2003 was never accommodated through ratification by the Nigerian legislature. Specifically, the convention requires countries to criminalize behaviour such as:

- (a) The bribery and the embezzlement of public funds
- (b) Influencing trading
- (c) The concealment and laundering of the proceeds of corruption (Idale 2018).

The domestication of the convention was expected to create: arrangements to strengthen international cooperation; arrangements to prevent the transfer of funds obtained through corruption and lastly, ways of monitoring a country's compliance with the Convention. Agreed that the ICPC, EFCC and Money Laundering Acts would have captured some of the issues addressed by the convention, but the domestication of such international articles would have strengthened the extant rules against corruption. Perhaps, the lackadaisical attitude of the Nigerian lawmakers towards domesticating such an important anti-corruption law accounts for the unabated corrupt practices. For instance, New Zealand, which is ranked by transparency international as the least corrupt country in the world in 2006 took immediate steps to domesticate the convention. The political will on the part of the New Zealand policy makers, which their Nigerian counterparts lacked, thus accounts for the rating and position of each country on the corruption index (Idale, 2018).

In fact, it appears that the passage of bills on anti-corruption in Nigeria, most of which were amendments, was not done with the intent of stamping out corruption by the legislators, but rather out of fear of negative public opinion. The fact that the central legislature was responsible for initiating over 30 per cent of bills passed between 1999 and 2003 and

successfully counter vetoed four of the ten bills vetoed by the executive during the period suggest that the legislators, perhaps, with the mindset of recouping what they invested in the election were unwilling to introduce legislation that could abort their objective of private accumulation. This, perhaps, explains the lukewarmness and reluctance of the legislature in playing an effective role to curb corruption. Hence, an initiative on a matter relating to anti-corruption legislations often emerged from the executive, while the legislature merely deliberated and passed.

Furthermore, despite the latitude accorded the legislature to decide whether any subject may be considered criminal and added to the range of subjects on which the Code of Conduct Tribunal could act, the legislature has simply been inactive and demonstrated that it is bereft of the initiatives to strengthen the extant rules. Thus, it is not out of place to say that the legislature has failed to utilize its power of law making to fight corruption, as envisaged by the constitution since the country returned to democracy in 1999. Hence, the legislature has played only a very fringe role in the fight against corruption through its power of legislation. For instance, the Freedom of Information Bill 2007 which was passed by the fifth assembly (2003-2007) was vetoed by the former president. The bill, from all intents and purposes, would have granted the public, especially the mass media and civil society, unfettered access to information in government establishments. The inability of the legislature to override the presidential veto, or re-pass the bill since it was represented in 2007, does not portray the assembly as having the political will to stamp out corruption in the society. Indeed, how the legislators have handled the bill is a further indictment on the capability of the Nigerian central legislature to provide the required platform to combat corruption under the Fourth Republic (Idale 2018).

Despite the seeming popular consensus among media practitioners, civil society groups and members of the public that the freedom of information bill, pending in the assembly, has the potential to entrench accountability and transparency in governance, political consideration appeared to have an over-riden reason, perhaps, because of the source of the bill. The bill is a private member bill with the lead sponsor (Hon. Abike Dabiri from Lagos state) being a member of the Action Congress, one of the opposition parties in the central assembly (Idale 2018). Hence, the bill appeared to have been undermined by party politics, irrespective of whatever benefits the nation stands to derive from its passage. Free information access and

flow are strongly believed to be capable of reducing corruption in any society. According to Pope (2006), although making anti-corruption laws may not by itself stamp out corruption, but focusing laws on specific areas might help curb corruption. Thus, freedom of information laws which has, as a component, a requirement for disclosure of assets by public officials as well as giving unfettered access to information, especially on public spending and resources may likely reduce corruption. If the freedom of information possesses the capability to reduce corruption, the inability of the Nigerian central legislature to successfully push through the information bill which has hibernated in the house for three years translates into a further undermining of the anti-corruption war by the legislature. In a similar vein, the several calls by the International Parliamentarian Association (IPA) on the national legislature and the formation of the Global Organisation of Parliamentarians Against Corruption to sensitise local legislature to put in place appropriate legal framework by national legislatures to curb corruption have remained unheeded by the Nigerian parliamentarians. This is evident by the inability of the legislature to sponsor a bill on anti-corruption and pass the same irrespective of the position of the executive on such bill. The above scenario portrays the inefficiency of the National Assembly despite the enormous power bestowed on them in respect to the anti-corruption crusade in Nigeria. In some cases, they were indicted for corruption acts as we have seen from the ministerial nominees and budget padding in National Assembly.

### **Political Will and Anti-corruption Crusade in Nigeria**

Furthermore, the legislature has also consistently demonstrated in the past ten years that it is bereft of the political will to check corruption through its power of oversight. However, in certain respects, the legislature has largely proved that it did not lack the power to expose corrupt practices as evidenced by the exposure of the abuse of power in the executive branch (Alabi, *et al.* 2010). The investigation of former President Obasanjo and his deputy, Alhaji Atiku Abubakar, over the mismanagement of Petroleum Technology Development Funds PTDF and the power sector spending between 1999 and 2007 are a few examples of successful investigations undertaken by the assembly to expose abuse of power in the executive arm (Reps probe concessioning with Atiku's firm, 2008; PTDF report destabilizing, 2007; Power probe: Reps panel erred on Obasanjo-Masari, 2008). While the foregoing suggests that the legislature could effectively expose and by implication reduce corruption in governance, the personal gain to be derived by members of the assembly

through acquiescence or compromise often override the imperative to check corrupt practices. The tendency to compromise has often eroded the capability of the Nigerian legislature to serve as a bulwark against corrupt practices in government institutions. The implication of this is that the legislature has been incapable of discharging its oversight responsibility effectively (Fashagba, 2009). The compromise, as Fashagba points out, has taken the form of committee members colluding with administrative officers to appropriate public funds for private use (SGF bars ministries from funding National Assembly's activities, 2008).

Furthermore, the tendency of members of the Nigerian legislature to seek an opportunity to extort money from people having contact with them has negatively affected its capability to serve as an anti-corruption agent. The legislature has exhibited incapability in ensuring transparent and accountable government. This it demonstrated in lack of interest to scrutinize the audited accounts of the federation on the floor of the house since 1999. The public account committees of the two-chamber legislature did not consider it worthwhile to present to the central legislature any audited report of the federation account between 1999 and 2007 while President Obasanjo was in power. Until 2008 when a mention of an audited account of the federation was made on the floor of the assembly, the legislators appeared not too concerned with embarking on systematic scrutiny of public spending. Most often, only spontaneous reactions have been made on public spending, especially when the assembly seeks to attack the executive over certain actions. This was most evident during the tenure of Alhaji Umar Ghali Na'abba as the speaker of the lower chamber between 1999 and 2003 and between 2007 and 2009 under Speaker Oladimeji Bankole.

By this, despite some sporadic public hearings on certain activities of government and some of its agencies, especially between 1999 and 2009, the legislature has been lethargic in holding government to account by scrutinising public spending beyond this; however, is the evident erosion of moral basis on which the legislature could anchor any anti-corruption posture (Alabi, *et al.*2010). The legislature, as Fashagba avers, has been home to a series of scandals bordering on financial impropriety. The incident of scandals in the legislature has resulted in the removal of at least three Senate Presidents and two Speakers of the House of Representatives between 1999 and 2009 (Bello-Imam, 2005; Global Integrity, 2004). The disturbing dimensions of scandals in the Nigerian National Assembly, especially the one involving a former Senate President, Senator Adolphus Wabara (2003-2005), prompted the



former President, Olusegun Obasanjo, to assert that, 'it is disheartening that the number three man in the government hierarchy in the country is involved in this sordid matter' (Alabi, *et al.* 2010). Perhaps, more than any other reason, the high profile scandals that a large number of members of the assembly have been involved in appeared to have undermined, and indeed, crippled the capacity of the assembly to serve as an anti-corruption agent. Between 1999 and 2009 different forms of corrupt practices involving both principal officers and members of the two-chamber assembly have been experienced as shown in Table I. Often the Ministries over which committees of the two houses have oversight responsibilities are taking advantage to extort money or other material benefits (SGF bars ministries from funding National Assembly's activities, 2008). This attitude has a crippling effect on the fight against corruption.

Consequently, rather than scrutinizing administration to ensure prudence in the utility of appropriated resources and ensuring compliance with set rules among the implementing agencies and departments of government, the legislature has, through lack of self-restraint, mortgaged its moral basis to demand transparency and accountability. This appears to have affected the extent to which the legislature would have performed in this respect. This is because the legislature has demonstrated that when it is ready to work it could check corruption and expose abuse of office. This is evident in the number of investigations and public hearings through which several incidents of abuse of office by government officers have been exposed. Through public hearings by different legislative committees, the disappearance of an oil bunkering ship, MT Africa Pride kept in the custody of the Nigerian Navy, was exposed (Babawale, 2006). Also, the discrepancy in the account of and mismanagement in the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC); the abuse of office by former political and career officers of Federal Capital Territory (FCT) between 2003 and 2007; and the mismanagement of the Power Project fund between 1999 and 2007 were exposed when different committees of the house beamed their searchlight on the activities of different agencies and ministries. Apart from using its law-making and oversight powers to curb corruption, the third identifiable basis on which the legislature is expected to serve as an anti-corruption agent is that elected members are the representatives of the people. The legislators, especially of the developing countries are aware of the pervasiveness of poverty among the greatest number of people. In most cases, mismanagement and/or

misappropriation of public funds and other forms of abuse of office by state elites are the immediate cause of pervasive poverty. Hence, the legislature is looked upon to ensure prudence and accountability by publicizing government activities and reflecting the wishes and concerns of members of their constituencies in policy-making (Alabi, *et al.*2010).

However, the legislators appear not to have served as the 'eyes and ears of their various constituencies in ensuring that appropriated resources are channelled to projects and programmes for which they were meant. So far under the eight republics, the legislators are yet to prove that intervening in the political process to secure maximum goods for the majority of the represented is their concern. Over and over again disputes over budgetary provisions, for instance, have resulted more from the refusal of the executive to allow the legislature to allocate a huge sum to itself. In 2008, the President denied assent to the appropriation bill on the ground that the legislature increased the amount due to it by over 70 per cent. By this, the legislature, largely concerned with private gain, pay little or no attention to the fight against corruption in the executive arm. This negates the expectation of constituents and citizens which according to Transparency International (TI) (2007), Expect parliamentarians to maintain a high moral standard in their professional and private lives. They expect parliamentarians to serve out of conviction and a commitment to the public good, rather than for aspirations of personal power and the pursuit of private profit. The arraignment of the Chairman, Senate Committee on power, Senator Nicolas Yahaya Ugbane and Chairman, House Committee on power, Honourable Ndudi Elumelu in a Federal High Court in May 2009 over misappropriation of about \$5.2 billion appropriated for the power sector under the 2008 amended budget lends credence to the fact that most members of the Nigerian legislature are self-serving (N5.2bn power scam: EFCC freezes contractors' accounts, 2009). The legislators were able to perpetrate the act by smuggling the amount into the amended Appropriation Bill 2008. The misappropriation of the power sector funds was perpetrated by the legislators acting in concert with top officers of the Ministry of Power. Considering the collapse of the power sector in Nigeria, the legislators were expected to play a major role and work toward resuscitating the power sector in the interest of the represented. However, the problem in the power sector was seen by the lawmakers as a means of siphoning money from the public purse. The above revelation validated our stated hypothesis that Nigerian lawmakers lack the political will in fighting corruption in Nigeria. In some

scenarios, as we have seen from the above, the hunter became the hunted. A lot of Nigerian lawmakers were arraigned in the courts for corruption-related offences (Alabi, *et al.* 2010).

Be that as it may, the National Assembly from 2015-2019 has made some effort in regard to the anti-corruption crusade which would be acknowledged. Although, their efforts are not up to 10% of the constitutional bequeathed on them. This made their little effort immaterial. But we must acknowledge it. At the inception of the 8<sup>th</sup> National Assembly led by Senator Bukola Saraki, the Assembly has pledged that they will give all necessary legislative support to the administration of President Muhammadu Buhari to fight and reduce corruption to the barest minimum (Wale, 2018). His previous actions and bold steps taken such as the fuel subsidy probe and the passage of key anti-corruption bills shows that he is truly committed to the anti-corruption crusade (Idale 2018). According to Wale (2018), with the tenacious effort of the National Assembly in the anti-corruption crusade, under the leadership of Bukola Saraki, the Assembly has passed the following bills whistleblowers protection bill, witness protection bill, Anti-money laundering bill, mutual assistance in criminal matter bill, and the Nigerian financial intelligence unit (UNFIU) bill.

**The Whistle Blowers Bill:** This is seen as one of the potent bills aimed at curtailing and tackling corruption. The bill when signed into law seeks to encourage and facilitate the disclosure of improper conduct by public officers and public bodies and was presented by the committee on Judiciary, human rights and legal matters, chaired by Senator David Umaru, the member representing Niger East District in the 8<sup>th</sup> National Assembly (Okocha, 2017). The bill seeks to ensure that persons who make disclosure and persons who may suffer reprisals about such disclosures are protected under the law. The bill also specifies who is qualified to make disclosures of improper conduct, the procedure for making disclosures and the protection due to Whistleblowers” (Okocha, 2017).

**Witness Protection Bill:** This bill seeks to protect a witness who provide vital information, evidence or help law enforcement agencies during investigations, enquires, or prosecution (Wale, 2017).

**Anti-Money Laundering Bill:** This bill aims to tackle cross border crimes and help authorities tackle money laundering and funding for terrorism by allowing its financial intelligence unit to operate free of state control.

**Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matter:** This bill aims at enhancing the collaboration and mutual assistance between the Nigerian government and its foreign counterparts. This bill will also help to facilitate the identification, tracing, freezing, restraining, recovery, forfeiture and confiscation of precedes of crime wherever they are located.

**The Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) Bill:** This bill is in line with international best practices establishes a substantive and autonomous financial unit in Nigeria, that will promote the exchange of information with all countries on an issue that relates to criminal intelligence and financial investigations that deal with money laundering, terrorism financing, the proliferation of arms, corruption, financial and economic crimes (Okocha, 2017). The above-mentioned bills form the pinnacle of National Assembly in the crusade against corruption.

## Conclusion

Evident from the few investigations actively conducted by the legislature, with demonstrable potential to uncover wrongdoing, the mission set for the legislature under the 1999 Constitution is not outside the body's control. Nonetheless, the Constitution provides sufficient protections for the successful execution of legislative duties in the battle against corruption. Rather, the legislature's failure to function was not unconnected with the lack of political commitment to participate and fight anti-corruption campaigns. Similarly, the legislature's failure to keep the executive branch accountable is largely due to Nigeria's two-chamber federal legislature having the dominant majority. Legislators, of differing political affiliation and 'ideological' division, clearly lack the intellectual integrity to accept the substantive mandates in their day-to-day legislative and other practices. Evident in Nigeria after the country returned to democracy after 1999, particularly between 1999 and 2007, the executive was a lone ranger and the only significant noticeable anti-corruption crusader among government institutions. The legislature declined to offer significant devotion to the government's anti-corruption crusade, as the political interest of politicians seems to conflict with the duty and obligation requested by the agency and anticipated by the public. The lack

of structural and substantive assistance from a large entity like the legislature will only undermine a compromised democratic society.

The president's lack of tangible legislative support to supplement anticorruption initiatives, particularly between 1999 and 2019, was the worsening culture of national cake sharing syndrome. Also by individuals drafted into the executive arm, the legislature's unethical nature acted as psychological reinforcement, justifying the executive's failure to curb or regulate corruption in the process. Largely, the anti-corruption crusade seems most effective on paper, but nothing has been done. Occasional legislative anti-corruption flares typically have a vendetta undertone. Much of the legislature's anti-corruption agitations responded to executive threats or insinuations against other legislative wrongdoing. Consequently, instead of scrutinizing the executive to ensure transparency, the legislature is continually on the defensive trying to clear itself from one form of controversy or another.

### **Recommendations**

The study made the following recommendations:

- (1) The National Assembly must fight corruption by setting good examples first. The examples provided by the above case studies cannot be a good National Assembly representation in the fight against corruption
- (2) The National Assembly needs to rethink its over-bloated remuneration problem. As mentioned elsewhere in this report, RMAFC is legally allowed to address National Assembly remuneration. Indeed, it violates the fundamental concept of natural justice because the National Assembly fixed its remuneration. This leads to the further suggestion that the National Assembly will initiate its self-regulation mechanism and try to do what is morally right and ethically acceptable.
- (3) The National Assembly will take stock of the governing mechanisms in other countries, such as Brazil, as mentioned above; where the legislature introduced a reform that resulted in the impeachment of the worst president in its history in 1992. However, we caution that the National Assembly's use of the impeachment wand in Nigeria must be such that it is used only when the need for the same has arisen. The argument from the above is that Brazil currently ranks 66th cleanest country out of 176 nations according to the TI Corruption Index

in 2012.

(4) The National Assembly shall strengthen its oversight role in fighting corruption by exercising its transparency and oversight functions. Most of the National Assembly's fight against corruption in Nigeria will be won or lost based on how the National Assembly will refer to its transparency and oversight functions.

(5) The National Assembly shall collaborate and work with governments, associations, and civil society important to its oversight functions. They must ensure that their work yields concrete results.

(6) The National Assembly requires an effort to counter graft. We propose that since each member comes from a district, they should have an effect on the fight to eliminate corruption for the Nigerian nation's common good. They will focus on anti-corruption mass mobilization initiatives.

(7) The National Assembly should amend the definition of corruption in the Criminal Code and the Penal Code according to the Kenyan Anti-Corruption and Financial Crimes Act 2003, which describes corruption as 'counterfeiting, bribery, embezzlement or misappropriation of public funds, misuse of power, breach of confidence, and any crime involving dishonesty in the election of any official to parliament.

## References

1. Abimboye, D. (2010). *A House of Fraud*. Lagos, Newswatch Magazine, July, page 14.
2. Achebe, C. (1983). *The trouble with Nigeria: Enugu; Fourth Dimension publishing Ltd*. Africana first publishers Plc.
3. Agbo, A. (2012). *The Oversight Haram*. Lagos, Tell Magazine, July, pages 45-51.
4. Akanbi M. (2004). 'Current Policy Initiatives and Frameworks for Combating Corruption in Nigeria' *The Nigerian Social Scientist*, 7(1), March. pp 2-6.
5. Akintunde, K. (2003). Damaging Allegations. *The Week Magazine*, Oct., page 15-17.
6. Alabi, M.O.A., Joseph, A. & Fashagba, Y. (2010). The Legislature and Anti-corruption Crusade under the Fourth Republic of Nigeria: Constitutional Imperatives and Practical Realities. *International Journal of Politics and Good Governance*, 1(2), 21-29.
7. Animashaun, M.A. (2007). Corruption and Public Confidence in State Leadership: A Study of Nigeria's 4<sup>th</sup> Republic" Corruption and the Challenge of Human Development. School of Management and Social Sciences, Babcock University, Ilishan-Remo pp. 435-445.

8. Cletus, C.O. (2001). Constitutional development and citizenship education. Enugu Press
9. Dan, A. (1992). Corruption. New Watch (03)9.
10. Ayobolu J. (2006). *EFCC, Corruption and the Due Process*. Segun Toyin Dawodu, USA
11. Babawale, T. (2006). *Nigeria in the crises of governance and development*. Political and administrative resource centre (PARC).
12. Bello-Imam, I. B. (2005). *The war against corruption in Nigeria: Problems and prospects*. College press and publisher ltd.
13. Colonial Government Report (1947). The African background and outlook on public morality are very different from that of the present Briton. Retrieved from: <http://www.alaafin.oyo.org/main/the-history-of-present-day-oyo-city>.
14. Dike V. E. (2001). Corruption in Nigeria: A new paradigm for effective control' Africa economic analysis. <http://www.afbis.com/analysis/corruption-dike.htm>.
15. Drenkat, C. (2016). *Budget padding: Between National Assembly and law*. Abuja, Forefront Magazine, August, pages 16-17.
16. Ebenezer, D. (2010). Corruption as a threat to human security in Africa: Protecting Human Security in Africa. Oxford University Press.
17. Fashagba, J. 'Y. (2009). Legislative oversight under the Nigerian presidential system. *Journal of legislative studies*, 15(4), 32-39
18. Gauba, O.P. (2009). *An introduction to political theory*. Rajiv Beri Macmillan publishers Ltd.
19. Global Integrity (2004) country report. [www.globalintegrity.org/reports/2004/2004/country](http://www.globalintegrity.org/reports/2004/2004/country)
20. I.C.P.C .(2006). Nigeria and corruption. Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission, Nigeria
21. Ibrahim, M. M (2018). Challenges in combating corruption in Nigerian democratic dispensation and its possible solutions. <https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/challenges-in-combating-corruption-in-nigerian-and-mikail-abdullah/337eafba618f160b83ea379b6af4da73fb54afc9>
22. IRIN Africa (2009). Nigeria: Why Obasanjo war on corruption is faltering. [www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid](http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid) Juta and Co Ltd. N5.2bn power scam: EFCC freezes contractors' accounts/ *The Punch*, Lagos. Tuesday, 19 May.
23. Mark, D. (2009). Why our laws, policies, programmes fail. This Day newspaper, Lagos, June 09.
24. Mathekga, R. (2008). The ANC leadership crisis and the Age of Populism in Post-Apartheid South Africa. In Pretorious J. (ed). *African politics: Beyond the third wave of democratization*, pp 131-149. Cape Town,
25. Mbah, G. (2002). *Valley of Corruption*. Lagos, Insider Weekly Magazine, December, page 19.
26. Mbah, M.C. (2006). *Political theory and methodology*. Rex Charles & Patrick Ltd.

27. Mbeki T. (1999). Address of the President of South Africa to the 9th IACC. Durban, South Africa. October 10-15 Online: [ww.transparency.org/iacc/9thiacc/papers.htm/#links](http://www.transparency.org/iacc/9thiacc/papers.htm/#links)
28. McLean, I. & McMillan, A. (2009). *Concise dictionary of politics*. Oxford university press.
29. Mogae F. (1999). Corruption and the North-South Dilemma. Paper at 9th IACC Durban, South Africa.: [www.transparency.org/iacc/9thiacc/papers.htm/#links](http://www.transparency.org/iacc/9thiacc/papers.htm/#links)
30. Mojeed O.A. A. and Joseph, 'Y. F. (2010). The Legislature and Anti-corruption Crusade under the Fourth Republic of Nigeria: Constitutional Imperatives and Practical Realities. *International Journal of Politics and Good Governance*, 1(4), 29-33
31. Morris, S. D. (2016). Corruption in Latin America: An Empirical Overview. <http://elauditor.rocketweb.com.ar/files/4fc5e8e846f9b.pdf>
32. Nmeribeh, M. (2010). *Nigeria is in a Mess*. Lagos, The News Magazine, August, pages 18-23.
33. Nnochiri, I. (2013). \$3 million Bribery Scam: Farouk, Emenalo to spend one week in Kuje Prison. [www.vanguardngr.com](http://www.vanguardngr.com)
34. Nweke, K. & Nyewusira, V. (2017). Anti-corruption crusade in Nigeria: An Assessment of the Disposition of the National Assembly (1999-2013). *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, 8(4), 196-204
35. Okocha, C. (2017). Senate and Buhari's anti-Corruption Crusade. Sunday Magazine, March 18, 2018.
36. Okoli, E. F. (2003). *Foundation of government and politics*. Onisha.
37. Okoro, M. (2002). *Third Republic: A Story of Corruption*. Lagos, Insider Weekly Magazine, December, page 25
38. Olutola, F.O. & Oyeleke, I. O. (2016). Legislative Corruption and the Challenges of Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria. *Applied Science Reports*, 14 (3), 230-236
39. Osoba, S.O. (2013). Corruption in Nigeria: Historical Perspective. Review of African Political Economy. <http://www.roape.org/pdf/6903.pdf>
40. Paul, (2018). A critical examination of anti-corruption organs in Nigeria and effective way of curbing corruption, 1999-2012. *Journal of Academic*, 4(2), 32-34
41. Scott, J. C. (1972). *Comparative political corruption*. Prentice-Hall, New Jersey,
42. Senyo B.S. & Adjibolosoo, K. (1996). *Human factor engineering and the political economy of African development*. Greenwood Publishing Group.
43. Suleiman, T. (2011). *This house has failed*. Lagos, Tell Magazine, June, pages 22-23.
44. Tignor R.(1993). Political corruption in Nigeria before Independence. *Journal Modern African Studies*, 6(4), 175 – 202;
45. Umaru, U.D. (2017). Corruption and Legislative Functions in Nigeria. *IOSR Journal of Economics and Finance (IOSR-JEF)*, 8(1), 01-08
46. United Nations (1990). Corruption in Government. Report of an International Seminar



Held in Hague, Netherlands.

47. USA/Africa Dialogue, (2005). No 526: Nigerian corruption saga.  
[www.utexas.edu/conference/africa/ads](http://www.utexas.edu/conference/africa/ads)
48. Williams, D. (2016). *What Manner of Senate?* Abuja, The politico Magazine, May, pages 17-18.